Pasquantino that the common-law revenue rule did not clearly prohibit prosecutions for evading foreign taxes when the wire-fraud statute was enacted.5
Lower federal courts, however, have considered the revenue rule to be federal common law.6 The cases making this assertion have involved claims by foreign governments to recover damages under the federal RICO statute for tax revenues lost to smuggling. Federal courts have uniformly held such claims to be barred by the revenue rule as an indirect enforcement of foreign tax laws.7 In one case, the foreign government brought suit not just under the federal RICO statute but under its state counterpart, a claim the district court held to be preempted because of the revenue rule's supposed status as federal common law.8 According to a recent count, 35 States have their own RICO statutes,9 and the preemption of such state statutes in cases brought by foreign governments to recover lost tax revenues makes a certain amount of sense. As the Second Circuit noted in what is still the leading case, the continuing vitality of the revenue rule rests on its "congruence with the international tax policies pursued by the political branches of our government."10 As discussed below, the United States has entered into tax treaties with many nations, only a few of which provide for collection assistance.11 The Second Circuit concluded that " [d] eclining to apply the revenue rule in this case would arguably undermine the considered policy judgment of our political branches" and "would potentially allow Canada to obtain assistance it has not negotiated for."12 Letting foreign governments substitute state RICO claims for their federal ones would have the same effect, undercutting the federal policy not to provide collection assistance in the absence of a specific treaty provision.
But treating the revenue rule and its penal-law cousin as federal common law raises other problems. First, it would be a significant departure from the general rule that the conflict of laws and the recognition of foreign judgments are governed by state law in the United States.13 Second, it would call into question a number of state laws that do not appear to contravene any federal policy and seem otherwise unproblematic. For example, a number of States have enacted double-jeopardy statutes that bar prosecution for an offense of which the defendant has previously been convicted or acquitted by a foreign country.14 Such statutes clearly call for recognition of a foreign penal judgment, and if the penal rule were a rule of federal common law, they would seem to be preempted. But surely this would be federal overkill. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, States are not constitutionally required to extend double-jeopardy protection based on foreign convictions and acquittals,15 but neither is such protection problematic. It contravenes no federal policy established by treaty or statute, and is a choice that ought to be open to the States.
This essay argues for a middle course that would preempt state laws that interfere with clear federal policies-like the U.S. policy against providing tax collection assistance without a treaty provision-but would leave States free to recognize foreign tax and penal laws and judgments when no clear federal policy prohibits it. Doctrinally, this means treating the penal and revenue rules as rules of state common law, but recognizing that (as in other areas) state law may be preempted by clear federal policies, in this context, particularly policies found in U.S. treaties. It is important to make clear at the outset that whether the penal and revenue rules are federal or state common law does not implicate the debate about whether customary international law should be 12 Attorney General of Canada, 268 F.3d at 122. treated as federal or state law in the United States. 16 The rules against enforcing foreign penal and tax laws are rules of domestic law and not rules of customary international law.17 Thus, the penal and revenue rules may be rules of state common law even if customary international law is considered to be federal common law, or vice versa. Part I of this essay frames the issue by describing the contours of the penal and revenue rules. Part II notes that the conflict of laws and the recognition of judgments have generally been seen as questions of state law in the United States, and describes how the penal and revenue rules have been treated historically against that state-law background. Part III considers the case for treating the penal and revenue rules as federal common law, noting that the case is weaker than might be supposed and broader than necessary. Finally, Part IV sets forth an alternative theory of preemption-based on conflict with clearly established federal policy-that is narrower and more defensible than treating the penal and revenue rules as federal common law.
The Scope of the Rules
To appreciate the implications of allowing States to depart from the penal and revenue rules, or of federal law preempting such departures, it is useful to understand the contours of these two rules. Both rules developed at common law,18 and U.S. courts have frequently looked to the decisions of other common-law countries to define their scope.19 Nevertheless, whether a particular law or judgment falls within one of the rules is a question of U.S. law.20 On the scope of the penal rule, the Supreme Court's decision in Huntington v. Attrill is still the leading case. Huntington held that a law is "penal" for the purposes of this rule if "its purpose is to punish an offence against the public justice of the State" rather than "to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act."21 Under this definition, not all suits brought by foreign governments are penal.22 Thus, a U.S. court has allowed the United Kingdom to recover funds embezzled by the defendants,23 while a Canadian court has allowed the United States to enforce a judgment for clean-up costs under CERCLA.24 Courts have also held that the penal rule does not bar a foreign government from seeking restitution for the benefit of private persons. 25 Suits by private parties may be barred under the penal rule if brought in the name of the state, as with a qui tam action.26 But the rule does not bar claims under foreign competition law, for example, because the plaintiff seeks to recover based on its own injury, even though the plaintiff is sometimes the tribunal which is called upon to enforce it, to be, in its essential character and effect, a punishment of an offense against the public, or a grant of a civil right to a private person."). See Huntington, 146 U.S. at 673 (noting that qui tam actions "may stand on the same ground as suits brought for such a penalty in the name of the state or of its officers, because they are equally brought to enforce the criminal law of the state").
characterized as a "private attorney general."27 Neither are claims by private parties for multiple or punitive damages considered "penal."28 A tax claim, for purposes of the revenue rule, is "a claim for an assessment of a tax, whether imposed in respect of income, property, transfer of wealth, or transactions in the taxing state."29 The revenue rule has been held to bar both direct and indirect enforcement of tax claims.30 Thus, courts have denied liquidators' requests to recover assets to satisfy foreign tax claims.31 As noted above, U.S. courts have also rejected under the revenue rule efforts by foreign governments to use the federal RICO statute to recover tax revenues lost to smuggling.32 Although the question of indirect enforcement has arisen less frequently in a penal context, at least one court has held that the penal rule barred enforcement of a civil judgment on an appearance bond against a criminal defendant who fled the jurisdiction.33
The fact that the penal and revenue rules bar both direct and indirect enforcement does not, however, prevent courts from taking account of foreign tax and penal laws and judgments in other ways. Some of these ways are quite well established. In determining whether performance of a contract should As noted above, however, four States have laws requiring consideration of foreign penal judgments-convictions and acquittals-in a different way, as a bar to prosecution for the same offense under the law of that State.39 California used to have a similar double-jeopardy statute, but amended it in 2004 to remove the bar to prosecution and instead to give credit for time served abroad for the crime.40 These state statutes do not simply use the fact of a foreign conviction to determine how harshly to punish a new offense under domestic law. They instead recognize the foreign criminal judgment as a bar to a domestic prosecution (or in California's case as an offset against the sentence) in much the same way that giving res judicata effect to a foreign civil judgment precludes a new lawsuit. It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that such laws call for the direct enforcement of foreign penal judgments. That is not problematic if the penal rule is a rule of state common law, for state statutes can override state common law. But if the penal rule is instead a rule of federal common law, then state double-jeopardy statutes would be preempted to the extent they require recognition of foreign convictions or acquittals. Such preemption would be a departure from the general rule that the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States is governed by state law, to which this essay now turns.
The State Law Background
In the United States today, both the conflict of laws (on which the enforcement of foreign law turns) and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments implicated by the interpretation of the federal statute. This is particularly striking because Small was decided on the very same day the Court handed down Pasquantino, which considered how to construe the federal wire-fraud statute in light of the revenue rule. Until recently, the penal and revenue rules were treated in much the same way as the rest of the law of conflicts and judgments. Before Erie, they were considered rules of general common law. The Supreme Court made this explicit in Huntington v. Attrill, where it characterized the penal rule as one of "general jurisprudence," which a federal court "must decide for itself, uncontrolled by local decisions."53 After Erie, the penal and revenue rules were treated like other rules of conflicts and judgments law as questions of state law. In 1971, the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts stated that "no action will be entertained on a foreign penal cause of action" without any suggestion that this rule was one of federal common law from which the States could not depart by judicial decision or by statute.54 With respect to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, many States adopted Uniform Acts that reflect the penal and , another district court similarly concluded that the revenue rule was a rule of federal common law in another case brought by a foreign government seeking tax revenues lost to smuggling.66 The district court did not specifically state the basis for this conclusion, though it did note that the revenue rule was a judicial doctrine, like the act of state doctrine, based on separation of powers.67 The court did, however, rely expressly on the revenue rule's supposed status as federal common law to preempt Ecuador's state RICO claims, noting that "the Florida legislature has no authority under the supremacy clause to eradicate a federal common law rule."68 On appeal, having consolidated cases brought by Honduras and Belize, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 69 The Court of Appeals neither distinguished among the claims brought under the federal RICO statute, the state RICO statute, and state common law, nor relied expressly on the preemptive force of a federal common law rule. But it did refer to the revenue rule "as the rule of this circuit,"70 a phrase that would make no sense if the rule were one of state common law.
Thus, since the start of the twenty-first century, federal courts have departed from the general rule that the conflict of laws and recognition of foreign judgments are governed by state law and have begun to treat the revenue rule as a rule of federal common law that preempts state common-law and statutory claims. The courts' analysis of this question, however, has been sketchy at best, resting on brief invocations of "foreign relations," "separation of powers," and the Supreme Court's decision in Sabbatino. It is worth considering just how strong the case for federal common law might be.
The Case for Federal Common Law
Despite Erie's holding that there is "no federal general common law,"71 the federal courts may create federal common law in limited instances.72 As the Supreme Court recognized in Texas Industries, such instances "fall into essentially two categories: those in which a federal rule of decision is 'necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,' and those in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law.73 The first category includes "international disputes implicating . . . our relations with foreign nations."74 The archetypal example of federal common law for disputes implicating our relations with foreign nations is the act of state doctrine.75 In its "classic formulation," the act of state doctrine provides that " 'the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory.' "76 In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court noted that the act of state 70 Id. at 1256; see also id. at 1261 ("we adopt the revenue rule as the law of this circuit"). The Court described the "problems surrounding the act of state doctrine" as "intrinsically federal,"79 and stated that they "should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations."80 Certainly, the strongest case for treating the penal and revenue rules as federal common law rests on Sabbatino. The district court in the European Community case relied explicitly on that decision,81 while the district court in the Ecuador case did so implicitly by citing the act of state doctrine as a precedent.82 But Sabbatino's support for treating the penal and revenue rules as federal common law is not as powerful as it first appears. First, the Sabbatino Court itself suggested that States might depart in certain respects from its interpretation of the act of state doctrine. Second, the analogy to Sabbatino rests on the supposed similarity of the rationales for the act of state doctrine on the one hand and the penal and revenue rules on the other, a similarity that does not survive close scrutiny.
While Sabbatino held that the States were bound as a matter of federal common law to give foreign acts of state at least the same deference as the Supreme Court did in that case, the Court expressly left open the possibility decision for the courts of this country the official act of a foreign sovereign" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) The case for treating the penal and revenue rules as federal common law on the basis of Sabbatino also depends critically on the supposed similarity of the justifications for the act of state doctrine on the one hand and the penal and revenue rules on the other. In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court itself asserted the similarity. While acknowledging that the penal and revenue rules "presume[] invalidity in the forum whereas the act of state principle presumes the contrary," the Supreme Court asserted that "the doctrines have a common rationale"-specifically, "to avoid embarrassing another state by scrutinizing its . . . laws."84 But upon examination, this rationale for the penal and revenue rules proves less than convincing.
The that were contrary to its own public policy.86 "This is not a troublesome or delicate inquiry when the question arises between private persons," Hand reasoned, but the inquiry becomes more sensitive in the areas of penal and tax law.87 "To pass upon the provisions for the public order of another state is, or at any rate should be, beyond the powers of a court; it involves the relations between the states themselves, with which courts are incompetent to deal, and which are intrusted to other authorities. It may commit the domestic state to a position which would seriously embarrass its neighbor."88 Although the Supreme Court in Pasquantino described public-policy review as "the principal evil against which the revenue rule was traditionally thought to guard,"89 Hand's reasoning suffers from serious flaws. First, it assumes that foreign penal and revenue laws are more likely to be found in violation of U.S. public policy than other foreign laws. This seems highly questionable. "After all, every State collects taxes, every State has a criminal law," and such laws are broadly similar.90 Second, it seems questionable that selective non-enforcement of foreign tax and penal laws is more offensive than blanket non-enforcement. As Robert Leflar noted long ago, the possibility of holding a foreign tax or penal law contrary to public policy "would seldom be more offensive than a flat refusal to permit any action at all."91 Third, those foreign states most likely to pass penal or tax laws manifestly contrary to U.S. public policy are those the United States should be least concerned to offend. A policy that refuses enforcement to Canadian tax judgments in order to avoid offending Hitler's Germany seems difficult to defend.92 If the possibility of offending foreign governments by finding their penal and tax laws inconsistent with U.S. public policy seems low (or the possibility of offending them by a blanket refusal to enforce such laws seems high), then the case for preempting state laws that would permit such enforcement seems much weaker than with the act of state doctrine. Other rationales for the penal and revenue rules exist, but they do not support an analogy to the act of state doctrine or the case for preemption. Some courts and commentators have pointed to the supposed difficulty of applying with respect to state law claims-common-law or statutory-that would allow foreign governments to recover lost taxes.98
The case for federal preemption of state laws that would recognize foreign tax claims is strong because, as explained in Part IV, there is a clear federal policy manifested in numerous tax treaties not to recognize such claims in the absence of a specific treaty provision providing for collection assistance. But such a clear federal policy does not always exist. For example, as noted above, some States have double-jeopardy statutes that bar prosecution under state law of a defendant who has been convicted or acquitted of the same offense by a foreign court.99 To my knowledge, the United States has no federal policy on this subject, expressed in treaties or otherwise. Treating the penal and revenue rules as federal common law would sweep too broadly, preempting state law irrespective of federal policy. The better approach is to treat the penal and revenue rules as rules of state common-law, capable of alteration by state statute or judicial decision, but subject to preemption where a clear federal policy against recognition of foreign laws or judgments exists. Building on Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Zschernig v. Miller,100 Part IV sketches such an approach. with the United States' conduct of foreign relations,103 the Court held that the Oregon law was unconstitutional as "an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress."104 Concurring in the result, Justice Harlan took a narrower view. He rejected the majority's theory of dormant foreign affairs preemption and would have held that "in the absence of a conflicting federal policy or violation of the express mandates of the Constitution the States may legislate in areas of their traditional competence even though their statutes may have an incidental effect on foreign relations."105 Harlan concurred in the result because he found such a conflicting federal policy in the 1923 treaty with Germany guaranteeing the right to inherit property.106
Preemption by Federal Policy
The scope of foreign affairs preemption today remains controversial. Dissenting on behalf of herself and three other members of the Court in American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, Justice Ginsburg wrote: "We have not relied on Zschernig since it was decided, and I would not resurrect that decision here."107 But the majority did rely on Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Zschernig, as well as on Justice Harlan's concurrence.108 In a significant footnote, the Court suggested that the two approaches to preemption might be reconciled-that field preemption might be appropriate "[i]f a State were simply to take a position on a matter of foreign policy with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility," but that Harlan's conflict preemption approach might make sense where a State had acted within "its 'traditional competence' but in a way that affects foreign relations."109
The conflict of laws and the recognition of foreign judgments lie within the traditional competence of the States.110 Under Harlan's approach, the question would then be whether state laws departing from the penal and revenue rules would run afoul of "a conflicting federal policy. dissenting opinion in Garamendi did not expressly endorse Harlan's approach to foreign affairs preemption, the central question that divided the dissent from the majority was precisely how to determine the existence of a preemptive federal policy. For the Garamendi majority, a "consistent Presidential foreign policy" reflected in the statements of high-level executive officials was sufficient.112 For the dissent, "[t]he displacement of state law by preemption properly requires a considerably more formal and binding federal instrument," and the fact that the U.S. executive agreement with Germany dealing with Holocaust-era claims did not even address disclosure laws like California's indicated the absence of a preemptive federal policy. 113 Clearly, a conflicting federal policy may be established by an act of Congress. In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, for example, the Supreme Court held that a state law barring state entities from companies doing business with Burma was preempted by a federal statute delegating discretion to the President to establish a flexible sanctions policy with respect to that country.114 Just as clearly, a conflicting federal policy may be established by the express terms of a treaty or executive agreement.115
The Supreme Court has also held that in some instances a preemptive federal policy may be expressed by the absence of a treaty or other international agreement. In Holmes v. Jennison,116 the question was whether Vermont could extradite a fugitive to Canada. Chief Justice Taney noted that "[s]ince the expiration of the treaty with Great Britain, negotiated in 1793, the general government appears to have adopted the policy of refusing to surrender persons, who, having committed offences in a foreign nation, have taken shelter in this."117 Taney found this federal policy to be expressed by the absence of extradition treaties.118 Moreover, Taney found the federal policy on extradition to preempt state authority with respect to extradition. ("It is believed that the general government has entered into no treaty stipulations upon this subject since the one above mentioned; and in every instance where there was no engagement by treaty to deliver, and a demand has been made, they have uniformly What avails it that the general government, in the exercise of that portion of its power over our foreign relations, which embraces this subject, deems it wisest and safest for the Union to enter into no arrangements upon the subject, and to refuse all such demands; if the state in which the fugitive is found, may immediately reverse this decision, and deliver over the offender to the government that demands him?119
Although the Court in Holmes was equally divided, a majority of the Supreme Court subsequently endorsed Taney's opinion, which is now considered to be the position of the Court.120 Holmes does not mean that state law is preempted anytime it touches an area that could be the subject of a treaty. Such a rule would preempt the state law of judgments, as well as many other areas of regulation that the federal government has chosen to leave to the States.
Rather Holmes teaches that sometimes the lack of treaties, as well as limits in treaties that do exist, reflect a clear federal policy to limit cooperation with other nations. The Court looked the history of the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty, which would originally have prohibited the States from using combined reporting but was ratified by the Senate subject to the reservation that the relevant provision would not apply to state and local taxes.134 This history reinforced the conclusion that "Congress implicitly has permitted the States to use the worldwide combined reporting method."135 But to say that U.S. tax treaties do not limit the imposition of state taxes is not to say that States are free to assist in collecting foreign taxes. Foreign taxes are typically covered by the treaty and thus subject to the limitations contained in its collection assistance provision. Put more generally, the existence of a policy to permit States to tax freely expresses no exception to the separate policy reflected in U.S. tax treaties not to enforce foreign tax claims in the absence of a specific treaty provision.
It seems clear, then, that a state law permitting the collection of foreign tax claims other than pursuant to such a provision would violate federal policy and should therefore be preempted. This is obviously true when the claim is made by a foreign country with which the United States has an existing tax treaty. But it is also true where the claim is made by a country with which the United States has declined to enter such a treaty. As the district court noted in the Ecuador case, "the lack of a treaty is all the more reason why this Court must enforce the revenue rule. The United States has also chosen to depart from the penal rule by treaty in some instances. For example, the United States is party to two multilateral prisoner transfer treaties and several bilateral treaties that allow U.S. nationals convicted abroad to serve their sentences in the United States.138 Congress has provided for the implementation of these treaties through legislation.139 That legislation authorizes the Attorney General to act on behalf of the United States under existing treaties and to make arrangements with the States "for the confinement, where appropriate, in State institutions of offenders transferred to the United States."140 Were a State to enforce a foreign prison sentence in the absence of such an arrangement by the Attorney General, it would conflict with the scheme established by this network of treaties and federal legislation. 141 The United States has also agreed in some Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) to provide assistance in collecting criminal fines and forfeitures. The United States entered its first such MLAT with Canada in 1985, one article of which provided that "[t]he Parties shall assist each other to the extent permitted by their respective laws in proceedings related to the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime, restitution to the victims of crime, and the collection of fines imposed as a sentence in criminal prosecution."142 Restitution is not within the penal rule,143 but criminal fines and forfeitures are, which raises the question whether States may enforce criminal fines and forfeitures without treaty authorization.
As of 2012, the United States has MLATs with 63 countries.144 Thirty-eight of these treaties provide for assistance in the collection of criminal fines and forfeitures, like the U.S. MLAT with Canada quoted above,145 while an additional or forfeitures,147 and of course the United States does not have MLATs with a large number of countries. In a few instances, U.S. MLATs express a policy of not enforcing a particular kind of penal judgments not just by omission but by express provision. The U.S. MLAT with Israel, for example, states that "the parties shall not be obligated to enforce orders of restitution or to collect fines or to enforce judgments imposing fines."148 In short, the United States has not authorized the enforcement of foreign criminal fines and forfeitures across the board but rather through a series of specific treaty provisions, extending that right to some countries but not to others, and sometimes to some kinds of judgments but not to others. State laws that would enforce foreign criminal fines and forfeitures where the federal government has not chosen to do so would conflict with the federal policy of allowing such enforcement only pursuant to specific treaty provisions and, as in the tax area, would undercut the United States ability to negotiate future treaties providing for reciprocal treatment of U.S. fines and forfeitures.
On the other hand, some state laws recognizing foreign criminal judgments do not appear to violate any federal policy even though they would depart from the penal rule. The clearest examples are state double-jeopardy statutes that bar prosecution under state law when the defendant has been convicted or acquitted by a foreign country for the same offense.149 In the context of prisoner transfer, federal law prohibits a subsequent prosecution for the same offense by the federal government or by the States,150 as does the Inter-American Convention.151 But outside that context, there appears to be no federal policy either for or against extending double-jeopardy protection based on foreign criminal judgments. As Justice Harlan put it in Zschernig, "in the absence of a conflicting federal policy or violation of the express mandates of the Constitution the States may legislate in areas of their traditional competence even though their statutes may have an incidental effect on foreign relations."152
There are many kinds of state laws that might implicate foreign relations, and might even weaken the U.S. bargaining position in negotiations with other countries. The fact that most States recognize and enforce foreign judgments without requiring reciprocity undoubtedly weakens the position of U.S. negotiators seeking a judgments convention.153 The American Law Institute's proposed federal judgments statute included a reciprocity requirement precisely "to create an incentive to foreign countries to commit to recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered in the United States."154 It is not enough to preempt state law that topic could be the subject of treaty negotiations, for that is true of many areas of law that the federal government has chosen to leave to the States. When, however, U.S. treaty practice has established a federal policy not to permit the enforcement of foreign tax or penal laws or judgments in the absence of a specific treaty provision, then preemption of state law is clearly called for.
Conclusion
This essay has argued that federal preemption of state law departing from the penal and revenue rules is sometimes appropriate, but not across the board on the basis of federal common law. For better or worse, the conflict of laws and the recognition of foreign judgments in the United States have generally been left to the States. The Supreme Court's decision in Sabbatino offers only limited support for treating the penal and revenue rules as federal common law, both because Sabbatino itself recognized the possibility of state deviations from the act of state doctrine and because the rationales underlying the penal and revenue rules are different from those underlying the act of state doctrine. The better approach is to treat the penal and revenue rules as state common law, capable of alteration by state statute or judicial decision, and to limit federal preemption to situations where "a conflicting federal policy"155 exists. Under this approach, state laws enforcing foreign tax claims, foreign criminal sentences, and foreign criminal fines and forfeitures would be preempted, while state double-jeopardy statutes would not. Such an approach would protect federal prerogatives in foreign relations, but would also recognize that sometimes it is federal policy to leave even matters affecting foreign relations to the States.
